The role of narrative unity in Alasdair MacIntyre's theory of ethics

Categorised in:

1. Introduction

The concept of the narrative unity of a human life successfully fulfils four overlapping roles in MacIntyre’s theory: it exposes modern conceptions of human life as inadequate; it provides an overall end for a human life in light of which the goods of different practices can be ordered; it causes MacIntyre’s account of the virtues to bare greater resemblance to Aristotle’s account and it paves the way for the next stage in MacIntyre’s threefold theory – that of a tradition. Although the normative significance of the narrative conception of a human life does not at first seem compelling, I will argue that by viewing it in the light of MacIntyre’s wider theory, it can be seen to substantially advance MacIntyre’s argument in favour of a rational morality.

It is only possible to assess narrative unity’s role in MacIntyre’s theory if we have an understanding of the problems it is designed to overcome. Therefore the first part of my essay will consist of an account of the problems encountered thus far in MacIntyre’s theory. These problems provide the criteria by which I will go on to assess the role of narrative unity, a concept which is designed to overcome them. I will end with a brief account of how the concept helps pave the way for the next stage in MacIntyre’s moral theory.


2. The problems which narrative unity must overcome

2.1. Subjective morality

MacIntyre’s central complaint is that in the modern world we have no rational justification for claiming any action, person or state of affairs to be either good or bad only subjective assertions of preference. His self-appointed task is to restore an Aristotelian concept of morality, in which a person can be said to have an objective ideal-state, or telos. If such a state exists, it follows that dispositions which will aid a person in reaching this state can rationally be called virtues.


2.2. Disordered practice-derived ends

The first concept in MacIntyre’s three-stage argument in favour of such a morality is that of a practice – by which he means a craft or other such complex social activity (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 187). What is crucial about this concept, is that it provides us with objective standards of excellence and rational reasons for striving to achieve those standards – i.e. it provides a kind of substitute telos. I say “substitute” because the kinds of ends produced by practices do not amount to a satisfactory telos. The most critical problem is that of how to choose between the competing ends of the different practices of which one’s life consists (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 201). In order to have a rational means of making these choices we must have an adequate account of a telos for one’s whole life in light of which the competing ends of different practices can be ordered.

MacIntyre also notes that many virtues are not coherent without reference to a telos which transcends the ends of different practices (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 202). Similarly, truly Aristotelian virtues are not simply “skills professionally deployed in those situations where they can be effective”, but characteristics which can be expected to manifest themselves “in very different types of situation, many of them situations where the practice of a virtue cannot be expected to be effective in the way that we expect a professional skill to be” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 205). This kind of virtue locates its applicability, not only in specific practices, but in a whole life.


2.3. Modern conceptions of human life

MacIntyre argues that the nature of modern theories of human identity and action preclude the possibility of a genuine telos. Rather than viewing a human life as a unity, modern theories tend to fragment it. So in analytical philosophy, there is a “tendency to think atomistically about human action”, (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 204) – i.e. a human action can be adequately characterised without reference to its context. In parallel fashion, empiricists have “tried to give an account of personal identity solely in terms of psychological states and events” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 217), isolating the self from its context. In Sartre’s characteristically modern view, all attempts to bring together particular actions into a coherent story can never be more than illusions (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 214). Added to this philosophical attack on the notion of the unity of a life, is the psychological tendency in modern society to compartmentalise our lives into self-enclosed spheres (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 204).

Clearly if this kind of account of a human life is true, then it would be deeply misleading to try and assess a whole human life in terms of a single telos.


3. Narrative unity overcomes these problems

3.1. What is the narrative conception of life?

The defining feature of a narrative account of life is that actions and agents are understood only as elements in a story – that is they cannot be adequately characterised as separate, self-sufficient units. It is a conception of life as “more than a sequence of individual actions and episodes” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 204). Instead, life is to be understood as following the pattern of a story, with a beginning, middle and an end, heroes and extras, climaxes, digressions, subplots and so on (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 206).

MacIntyre is at pains to emphasise that this is not just an alternative way of viewing life, but is the correct way of understanding life. He shows how to characterise any particular action independently of its context, is to interpret it as no more than “unintelligible physical movement” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 208). This is an inaccurate interpretation because all human action is the result of an intention, and we can only understand that intention if we understand the agent’s context – his history, his beliefs and his setting, and the histories attached to those settings (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 206).

Hence, “narrative form is neither disguise nor decoration… Stories are lived before they are told” (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 211-212). We can now see how the conception of human life as a narrative fulfils its first role: that of exposing characteristically modern theories of human life as inadequate.


3.2. The narrative conception of life provides a telos

As already stated, in order to resolve the problems engendered by practices, MacIntyre must show that a true whole-life telos is possible. How is this achieved?

Firstly, a narrative account of life, unlike an atomistic account, is intelligible. We can see how each element of our lives fits into an overall sequence; and this intelligible sequence is one which is inherently teleological, for “there is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the form of a telos” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 215). Thus the nature of a narrative makes the concept of living one’s life in view of a telos a viable and natural concept.

Secondly, if, as MacIntyre argues, a person can only be conceived of as an element in a narrative, it is irrational for us to conceive of ourselves as a number of different, distinct characters within that narrative. Whatever empirical changes our body and minds may go through, we still possess one history within one overall narrative. We consist of “a character whose unity is given as the unity of a character… the concept of a person is that of a character abstracted from a history” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 217).

The unity assumed by a narrative is vital if we are to conceive of our lives as having a single telos. Indeed, the two concepts presuppose one another, since it is the existence of an overall telos which gives an overall unity to our lives

The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 219)

Thus a narrative conception of life allows for a telos in a way that is impossible if the characteristically modern excogitations about human life are taken to be true.

But of what does that telos consist? Obviously the answer would be a description of the “good life” for a given person; but since we do not yet know what the good life consists of, our aim must first be to discover it. Hence “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 219) and the concept of the narrative unity of a human life has fulfilled its second role in MacIntyre’s theory: that of providing an overall telos with which we can order the goods of practices; though how successfully this is done has yet to be shown.


3.3. Is this telos adequate?

While a life in spent in searching for the good life provides us with a rationally-desirable telos, and hence a rational reason for ordering our ends one way or another, it is still not clear how any substantial morality follows from this. MacIntyre tells us that, having now arrived at the concept of a telos¸ the virtues are to be “understood as those dispositions which not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kinds of quest for the good” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 219). But it is difficult to see how the kind of virtues we traditionally associate with goodness are necessary for such a quest: compassion, justice, promise-keeping, steadfastness. More worryingly, it seems some dispositions we would traditionally label vices would actually be useful in the pursuit of the good life. If we are to pursue the search for the good, surely a certain indifference to our less productive duties (e.g. to our family) and towards promises we have made in the past, would be helpful. Following our duties to others and keeping our promises may often lead to situations where we are restricted and prevented from embarking on our search for the good life. Should selfishness and fickleness therefore be counted virtues?

MacIntyre also acknowledges wealth, power and fame as legitimate goods (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 196). While the pursuit of these goods may endanger the pursuit of goods internal to practices, there is no such conflict when it comes to the pursuit of our own good. Suppose, in the course of our quest for the good life, we discover how much we enjoy wealth, power and fame? Would not ruthlessness and greed therefore become useful qualities? The nature of our telos seems to result in a definite conflict between the qualities useful in the attainment of goods internal to practices and those useful in the search for the good life.

Also, how useful is the search for the good life as a telos in terms of ordering the ends of the practices in which we are engaged? The necessarily over-riding nature of our quest would seem to make practices simply irrelevant, to be discarded as soon as they fail to serve any elucidating purpose in our central endeavour.

Together, these problems make MacIntyre’s attempt to provide a compelling virtue-based theory of morality look distinctly unpromising. However, there are several important aspects of the nature of the search for the good life which must not be overlooked before arriving at such a conclusion. Firstly, MacIntyre’s theory is such that if we accept his arguments thus far, we already have a substantial idea as to what the good life consists of. The concept of narrative unity provides us with an understanding of human nature that allows us to go some significant way towards defining our telos as something much more particular than a life spent in search of the good life.

For example, in arguing in favour of the narrative conception of life he shows that an unintelligible life is a definite evil (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 210) and that in order to have an intelligible life, we must conceive of ourselves as a unity. Therefore, a defining characteristic of the good life will be a coherent, unified personality – as opposed to the kind which adopts different personas in different situations.

Likewise, it is clear that MacIntyre believes that the good life will involve objectively-defined points in the light which we can evaluate our lives.

When someone complains… that his or her life is meaningless, he or she is often and perhaps characteristically complaining that their life… lacks any point, any movement towards a climax or a telos. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 217)

It is practices which provide us with just such points – self-justifying objective ends and challenging methods required for their attainment. Thus a good life will surely be a life in which one is engaged in and takes seriously the practices.

MacIntyre’s arguments also show that the good life is one where we do not conceive of ourselves as having an identity independent of our social roles, but conceive of these roles as essential constitutive parts of ourselves. To do otherwise is to diminish our identity into an illusive non-entity (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 32).

The idea of the good life consisting in the attainment of the goods of wealth, power and fame is also ruled out if we are to accept MacIntyre’s overall argument about human nature. It is argued that internal goods will ultimately be found to be more satisfying (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 188) while a life spent in search of pleasure itself will eventually turn out to be empty and unsatisfying (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 73).

Taken together, these considerations rule out dispositions to treat one’s roles and practices merely as means to an end, since a good life appears to require the ends given by roles and the practices associated with them are given primary importance. The qualities required for the pursuit of goods internal to practices and the pursuit of the good life turn out not to be so conflicting after all.

However, if practice-derived ends are to be conceived of as constitutive of the telos, rather than merely as means for achieving it, then the original problem of how to order such ends has not been resolved. Again, a partial answer can be found in MacIntyre’s previous arguments. If our lives follow a narrative structure, then it means that certain themes will emerge as self-evidently more crucial to the overall shape of our lives than others. For example, in the case of a conflict between the practice of sustaining a family and that of our profession, we may clearly be able to identify one as the main plot and the other as merely a subplot which has run its course. We need never decide between the value of different goods per se, but can place them in a context in which their relative value may become self-evident. Thus seeing life in terms of its overall narrative structure helps us to make rational decisions about our lives (Mulhall, 1996, p. 88).

We should also note the kind of conclusions which emerge regarding the virtues when we realise that the search for the good life is best achieved in company with others involved in that same search. As soon as a community based on this common end is formed, it will be evident that the interests of one’s fellow seekers are also one’s own interests. Hence the qualities necessary for the sustenance of such a community, and the kind of dispositions which allow one to engage with and attract a community (i.e. qualities we can expect to correspond with our traditional/intuitive catalogue of the virtues), find their place as virtues (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 219).

This leads us to the importance of MacIntyre’s argument that “it is in the course of the quest and only though encountering and coping with various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 219). So, it could be argued, it is engaging in a community based upon a common end, that we come to understand the good of being part of such a community and recognise the great value of certain dispositions. From this we could begin to construct an idea of what the ideal human would be like – i.e. we can begin to construct a more substantial telos, in which the virtues are valued for themselves, rather than as means to an end.

It is because a quest educates the person engaged upon it, about herself as well as about what she is seeking, that MacIntyre can define the good life for human beings as a life spent searching for the good life for human beings, and not be accused of leaving an empty circularity at the heart of his definition (Mulhall, 1996, p. 89).


3.4. Narrative unity adds substance to MacIntyre’s account of the virtues

The preceding argument has already shown to a great extent how the concept of a narrative unity fulfils its third role, that of bringing MacIntyre’s account closer to its Aristotelian completion. The virtues can now be defined as “contributing to the good of a whole life” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 273), as Aristotle himself saw them.

It is also important to MacIntyre’s theses that we come to value the virtues for themselves, and not simply as a means to an end.

Someone who genuinely possesses a virtue can be expected to manifest it in very different types of situation, many of them situations where the practice of a virtue cannot be expected to be effective in the way we expect a professional skill to be. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 205)

By conceiving of ourselves as a unified personality, as we do when consider ourselves as a character in a narrative, with a single telos, we can understand this distinction – that to really possess a virtue, it must become part of our identity, and since in a narrative we only have one identity, the virtues must be displayed in our whole lives, rather than specific practices.


4. Narrative unity relationship to the concept of tradition

In outlining the three-stage pattern of his theory of the virtues, MacIntyre tell us that “each later stage presupposes the earlier” (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 186 - 187). Hence the fourth role in MacIntyre’s theory is that of providing the background necessary to make sense of his notion of a tradition. In what way is the significance of a tradition dependent on the narrative unity of a life?

The tradition-stage of the theory requires that we take as our “moral starting point” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 220), those aspects of identity which define our place in our cultural surroundings – e.g. as a member of a family, a city and a profession. The indispensability of these aspects of our lives is made clear in the argument in favour of a narrative conception of life, where MacIntyre shows the inadequacy of any attempt to root an individual’s identity independently of his context.

For MacIntyre, the narrative of an individual’s life is to be understood against the background of the wider social context within which that individual finds himself or herself. (Horton et al, 1994, p. 11)

In this way, we are to understand ourselves as being inextricably connected and partially defined by certain histories, “the bearer of a tradition” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 221).


5. Conclusion

MacIntyre’s account of human life as a narrative provides a compelling insight into the nature of what it means to be a human and gives reason for optimism regarding the possibility of a rational virtue-based morality. However, although I argued that narrative unity does provide a substantial and useful telos, most of my arguments in favour of this conclusion were derived from what was implied in After Virtue, rather than what was explicitly stated., something I found necessary given the brevity of MacIntyre’s account of the role of narrative unity. As such I cannot be certain that my arguments reflect MacIntyre’s true intentions. Another weakness in my argument is that it rests on an understanding of human nature and happiness which, for the purposes of the essay, I have had to take as given.

However the scope and implications of MacIntyre’s enquiry are such that these weaknesses are inevitable. All I can claim to have to shown is that MacIntyre’s proposed theory of morality is coherent and challenging enough to be worthy of further research and debate.


Bibliography

• HORTON, John and MENDUS, Susan (1994), “Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After”, After MacIntyre, pp. 1 - 15 (eds. Horton, John and MENDUS, Susan), (Polity Press, Cambridge)
• MACINTYRE, Alasdair (1985), After Virtue, (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., London)
• MULHALL, Stephen and SWIFT, Adam (1996), Liberals & Communitarians, (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford)